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STUCK IN THE NET: PROMOTING GLOBAL SHARK AND
RAY POPULATIONS THROUGH NATIONAL
SUSTAINABILITY IMPORT LAWS
KELSEY PEDEN*

ABSTRACT
Shark and ray populations are crucial to a healthy oceanic ecosystem, but regulation of harm is difficult to manage for these highly migratory species. The massive decline of shark and ray populations has
triggered an international response, including collaborative protections
against the overharvest and sale of endangered groups. However, recent
studies show that protections must extend past direct harvest because an
estimated thirty to fifty percent of population kills occur through “accidental by-catch” in the fishing process. The United States has attempted
to fill some of the missing protections for sharks in national waters, as
well as to implement bans against the import of endangered shark and ray
species. While U.S. national trade laws put pressure on foreign nations
to end the over harvest of shark and ray species, they do not solve the issues of by-catch or traceability that haunt the supply chain. This Article
examines international regulations protecting shark populations as well
as U.S. import laws on highly migratory animals, ultimately theorizing
that trade regulations promoting sustainably harvested sea food are the
most promising path to protect shark and ray species.
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INTRODUCTION
In January 2021, the scientific world sounded the alarm after a
series of studies reported a global decline in shark and ray populations,
leading to predicted extinction.1 The study found “the global abundance
of oceanic sharks and rays has declined by 71% owing to an 18-fold increase in relative fishing pressures,” tracked over fifty years through Aichi
Biodiversity Targets and the Sustainable Development Goals.2 Ultimately,
it called for “strict prohibitions and precautionary science-based catch
limits” to avoid the extinction of shark and ray populations worldwide.3
Concern about the global shark and ray populations is not new—for
years, scientists have called for reform to environmental laws and fishing
regulations to better protect these necessary oceanic predators.4 Shark
and ray populations are critical to oceanic ecosystem survival.5 As toplevel predators, these animals maintain a balance among species and
encourage ocean health.6 Sharks, rays, and skates (a smaller relative of
rays and sharks), make up a group of cartilaginous fish referred to by the
scientific community as “elasmobranchs.”7 This population offers one of
1

See Nathan Pacoureau et al., Half a Century of Global Decline in Oceanic Sharks and
Rays, 589 NATURE 567, 567 (2021).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
See, e.g., Sharks and Rays, PROJECT AWARE, https://www.padi.com/aware/sharks [https://
perma.cc/33AD-MEJA] (last visited Mar. 11, 2022) (aiming to inform the general public
about the ecological need for sharks and rays to maintain a healthy ecosystem).
5
Id.
6
Elizabeth Murdock, More Vulnerable Than Vicious, Sharks Need CITES Protection, NAT’L
RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/elizabeth-murdock/more
-vulnerable-vicious-sharks-need-cites-protection [https://perma.cc/L73A-86QL].
7
Paolo Momigliano et al., Predators in Danger: Shark Conservation and Management in
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the “most diverse vertebrate groups on the planet,” including “over 1,000
species of sharks, rays, and chimaeras.”8 However, due to their long reproduction timeline and low rate of offspring, sharks and rays are especially
vulnerable to harm from over fishing, human exploitation, and environmental degradation.9 The demand for sharks and rays as “economically
valuable resources” has continued to grow over the decades, creating a
conflict between market forces and the drive for environmental preservation.10 More recently, movements to protect sharks and rays have hit the
mainstream media, as individual campaigns to end shark finning, “shark
fin soup”, ray dishes, and shark hunting festivals have spread.11
Overfishing and the harm to these populations as an accidental
by-catch of fishing are two of the main causes of population decline.12 As
a 2021 Nature study found, while:
Sharks and rays can be affected by many factors such as
climate crisis, oil and gas drilling, and ship strikes . . . the
main cause of decline has been by far overfishing. Proof of
this is the twofold increase in fishing with longlines and
seine nets, the gears used to catch oceanic sharks, during
the past half-century, and the rapidly rising catch rates.13
Part of this is intentional catch; demand for sharks and rays have increased over the previous decades as values for their “meet, fins, teeth,
Australia, New Zealand and Their Neighbours, in AUSTRAL ARK: THE STATE OF WILDLIFE
IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 467, 474 fig.3 (Adam Stow et al. eds., 2015).
8
Murdock, supra note 6.
9
Id.
10
See Lindsay Davidson et al., Why Have Global Shark and Ray Landings Declined:
Improved Management or Overfishing?, 17 FISH & FISHERIES 438, 438 (2016).
11
Rebecca Tatum, The Ecology and Controversy of Shark-Fin Soup, 43 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 667, 667 (2012); see also Marian Liu, Toxic Delicacy of Shark Fin Causes Ecosystem
Chaos, and Consumers Are Pushing Back, CNN (Feb. 4, 2019, 9:55 PM), https://www
.cnn.com/2019/02/04/health/shark-fin-chinese-new-year-hong-kong-intl/index.html
[https://perma.cc/S57J-LRD6]; Alan Yu & Paige Pfleger, Shark Fin Trade Faces Troubled
Waters as Global Pressure Mounts, THE SALT (Nov. 7, 2017, 5:15 PM), https://www.npr
.org/sections/thesalt/2017/11/07/561900736/shark-fin-trade-faces-troubled-waters-as-glo
bal-pressure-mounts [https://perma.cc/T9J3-SV6D].
12
Shark Threats, SEETHEWILD (Jan. 27, 2017), https://seethewild.org/shark-threats/
[https://perma.cc/V96G-MVFT].
13
Fermin Koop, Overfishing Is Causing Shark and Ray Populations to Plummet, ZME
SCIENCE (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.zmescience.com/science/overfishing-shark-ray-de
cline-29012021/#:~:text=Overfishing%20is%20causing%20shark%20and%20ray
%20populations%20to,Environment%2C%20News%2C%20Science%20Reading%20Ti
me%3A%204%20mins%20read [https://perma.cc/6Z26-4K33].

784

WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 46:781

oil, and skin” increase.14 For sharks specifically, studies show an increased
demand for shark fin has led to between 6.4% and 7.9% “of sharks of all
species . . . killed annually, with little chance to replenish the population.”15 As demand increases, “the tragedy of the commons”16 comes into
play. Without regulation, the drive to fill demand and to collect resources
before another country does, is depleting the shark and ray populations
despite environmentalists’ efforts to prevent this change.17
Part of shark and ray populations decline is attributable to accidental by-catch.18 By-catch is defined as “the unwanted fish and other
marine creatures caught during commercial fishing for a different species.”19 Use of outdated or non-sustainable fishing gear, such as gillnets,
trawlers, or long lines, often inadvertently catch sharks and rays who die
because they are unable to escape the nets.20 Each year, fishers catch an
estimated fifty million sharks on lines set for different fish, unintentionally
killing a critical population without any economic gain.21 A study commissioned by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(“FAO”) in the 1990s estimated “nearly a third of all reported shark catches
were landings from bycatch fisheries,”22 and a recent study put it higher,
14

Murdock, supra note 6.
Koop, supra note 13.
16
This concept highlights the conflict between individual and collective rational use of
natural resources. The idea, simplified, is resources left in the community pot will be
mass consumed out of fear of another individual using said resource before them, even
at the sake of community good. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).
17
Andrew Nowell Porter, Unraveling the Ocean from the Apex Down: The Role of the
United States in Overcoming Obstacles to an International Shark Finning Moratorium,
35 U.C. DAVIS ENV’T L. & POL’Y J. 231, 231 (2012).
18
See Shelby Oliver et al., Global Patterns in the Bycatch of Sharks and Rays, 54 MARINE
POL’Y 86, 86 (2015); Malcom Francis et al., Pelagic Shark Bycatch in New Zealand Tuna
Longline Fishery, 52 MARINE & FRESHWATER RSCH. 165, 165, 173 (2001); Lawrence R.
Beerkircher et al., Characteristics of Shark Bycatch Observed on Pelagic Longlines Off
the Southeastern United States, 1992–2000, 64 MARINE FISHERIES R. 40, 40 (2002); Derek
Dapp et al., Impact of Costa Rican Longline Fishery on Its Bycatch of Sharks, Stingrays,
Bony Fish and Olive Ridley Turtles (Lepidochelys olivacea), 448 J. EXPERIMENTAL MARINE
BIOLOGY & ECOLOGY 228, 228–29 (2013).
19
SHARON DEEM ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ONE HEALTH: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH
TO PLANETARY HEALTH 258 (2018).
20
See Oliver et al., supra note 18; Jonathon A. Gurish, Pressures to Reduce Bycatch on
the High Seas: An Emerging International Norm, 5 TUL. ENV’T L.J. 473, 475–78 (1992).
21
Julie Cappiello, The Fishing Industry Is Literally Killing Millions of Sharks. This is
How . . ., MERCY FOR ANIMALS (Apr. 19, 2017), https://mercyforanimals.org/blog/if-you-eat
-meat-youre-killing-sharks-heres/ [https://perma.cc/KZ2S-LYPR].
22
AURELIE COSANDEY-GODIN & ALEXIA MOORGAN, THE PEW ENVIRONMENT GROUP,
FISHERIES BYCATCH OF SHARKS: OPTIONS FOR MITIGATION 3 (2011).
15
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at nearly fifty percent.23 Simply put, elasmobranch populations are on
the decline because of targeted and accidental catch, both of which are
allowed to occur because of a lack of proper regulation.
International resistance to conservation has prohibited more conservation-friendly markets, such as the United States, from fully enacting
desired protections on migratory species. Profit incentives make international co-operation incredibly difficult to achieve.24 Instead, the United
States has introduced national trade laws, limiting the importation of nonsustainable seafood.25 Yet, gaps still remain, in both international and
national laws, which do not ban sales, regulate by-catch, or promote transparency in the supply chain.26 This Article analyzes the current protections
for elasmobranchs under international law and national trade laws, ultimately theorizing that stronger national import protections are likely the
most effective means of reducing shark and ray overfishing and by-catch.
I.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CO-OPERATION PROTECTING
SHARKS AND RAYS

While elasmobranch populations have declined over the previous
fifty years, international co-operation resulted in widely enacted protections for highly migratory species, such as sharks and rays.27 Nations
have always been interested in controlling their territorial waters.28 As
knowledge of ecosystem dependance and ocean resource drain grew; however, international bodies were formed to protect not only coastal waters,
but also to share an expanded interest in protecting the high seas.29 The

23

Id.; RAMÓN BONFIL, FOOD
BRANCH FISHERIES 4 (1994);

& AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., OVERVIEW OF WORLD ELASMOStevens et al., The Effects of Fishing on Sharks, Rays, and
Chimaeras (Chondrichthyans), and the Implications for Marine Ecosystems, 57 ICES J.
MARINE SCI. 476, 490 (2000).
24
See generally Leo R. Douglas & Kelvin Alie, High-Value Natural Resources: Linking
Wildlife Conservation to International Conflict, Insecurity, and Development Concerns,
171 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 270, 272, 275 (2014); GRETCHEN DAILY & KATHERINE
ELLISON, THE NEW ECONOMY OF NATURE: THE QUEST TO MAKE CONSERVATION PROFITABLE 25 (2002).
25
See generally Jordan K. Snyder, Shark-NATO: A Comparative Analysis of International
Shark Conservation to Nationalized Shark Conservation, 47 TEX. ENV’T L.J. 217 (2017).
26
See infra Sections I.A–C.
27
See Pacoureau et al., supra note 1.
28
Ocean Governance: Who Owns the Ocean?, THE GREEN POL. FOUND. (June 2, 2017),
https://www.boell.de/en/2017/05/30/ocean-governance-who-owns-ocean [https://perma.cc
/F3KD-JVZP].
29
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 77–78, 87–89, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) provides
a broad framework for ocean conservation.30 Enacted in 1994, UNCLOS
attempts to fill the gaps in oceanic protections not regulated through the
International Maritime Organization in the FAO.31 This, in turn, promoted
the establishment of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, Global
Regional Fishery Management Organizations (“RMFO”), and sectoral
bodies to regulate harvest.32 Trade regulation falls to the United Nations
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora (“CITES”) which entered into force in the 1970s.33 Together,
these conventions form a body of international conservation laws which,
in theory, should protect species like rays and sharks from human created population decline.34 In practice, however, the vague nature of these
conventions, and their lack of enforcement mechanisms, have left the seas
vulnerable to over exploitation.
This section examines some of these international conventions,
the protections offered to shark and ray populations, and the gaps in international coverage that continue to allow overharvest and by-catch.
These agreements highlight the difficulties in international conservation
efforts for highly migratory species, indicating a progressive use of national laws may be the best way forward.
A.

Establishing a Framework: The United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea

When UNCLOS was ratified in 1994, it was the most encompassing
law of the sea treaty to have been enacted.35 Currently, UNCLOS is signed
30

Stephen C. Nemeth et al., Ruling the Sea: Managing Maritime Conflicts through UNCLOS
and Exclusive Economic Zones, 40 INT’L INTERACTIONS 711, 736 (2014); see generally N.
Hassan Wirajuda, UNCLOS 35 Years Later: We Are Still at Sea, in THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT AND UNITED NATIONS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Myron H. Nordquist, John
Norton Moore, Ronán Long eds., 2019) (discussing the history of UNCLOS, its formation,
and its varied successes).
31
See generally UNCLOS, supra note 29.
32
Id. art. 61(2) (stating “[a]s appropriate, the coastal State and competent international
organizations, whether subregional, regional or global, shall co-operate to this end”); see
also id. art. 61(5); G.A. RES.48/194, Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks (Dec. 21, 1993) [hereinafter Fish Stocks].
33
U.N. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
opened for signature Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
34
Nancy K. Daves & Marta F. Nammack, US and International Mechanisms for Protecting and Managing Shark Resources, 39 FISHERIES RES. 223, 227–28 (1998); Erika J.
Techera & Natalie Klein, Fragmented Governance: Reconciling Legal Strategies for Shark
Conservation and Management, 35 MARINE POL’Y 73, 75 (2011).
35
UNCLOS, supra note 29.
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by 167 nations and the European Union.36 While the United States helped
create and define the majority of the principals codified in UNCLOS, it is
not a signatory.37 UNCLOS’s goals are to create an international standard
for ocean use, including guidelines for conservation, businesses, and consumption of natural resources.38 This is done, in part, by establishing
uniform “exclusive economic zones” (“EEZ”) which give nations sole exploitation rights within 230 miles from their “baseline” land.39 Conservation
within EEZs are managed under Article 62, which requires coastal states
“ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the
maintenance of the living resources in the EEZ is not endangered by overexploitation” while also promoting “the objective of optimum utilization.”40
This gives coastal states the power to set catch limits and to regulate the
use of EEZ resources.41 For resources that fall outside these zones in the
“high seas,” or fall into multiple EEZs, UNCLOS highlights the importance
of international conservation and co-operation.42 This is outlined in Articles
63(2) through 67, requiring coastal states to agree on measures, and coordinate, to ensure conservation and development of highly migratory species
that cross EEZs, and promote “the objective of optimum utilization.”43
In additional to UNCLOS’s language directed to conservation for
highly migratory species, the United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea of 10 December, 1982, relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (“Fish
Stocks Agreement”) also protects elasmobranchs.44 The Fish Stocks Agreement was formed after UNCLOS member states found that the “provisions
of . . . UNCLOS [], especially those relating to high seas fishing, owing to
their general character, are not sufficient to provide a solution to this situation.”45 The objective of this subset agreement is “to ensure the long-term
36

See id.
See generally Leland Holbrook Smith, To Accede or Not to Accede: An Analysis of the
Current US Position Related to the United Nations Law of the Sea, 83 MARINE POL’Y 184,
184 (2017) (discussing U.S. history of UNCLOS and why it is not a signatory).
38
UNCLOS, supra note 29; Lakshman Guruswamy, The Promise of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): Justice in Trade and Environment Disputes,
25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 189, 209 (1998).
39
UNCLOS, supra note 29, at arts. 56, 76.
40
Id. arts. 61–62.
41
Id. art. 62.
42
Id. arts. 63, 87–89.
43
Id. arts. 63–67.
44
See Fish Stocks, supra note 32, at art. 1.
45
Id. at Introduction.
37
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conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly
migratory fish stocks.”46 This is done through a precautionary approach,
encouraging nations not only to share data on populations, but also to
monitor and control overfishing in order to guarantee the continued existence of resources.47
UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Agreement set out international
standards for conservation, including specific language for highly migratory
species that cover many species of sharks and rays.48 However, while
UNCLOS has achieved some noticeable wins such as reducing coastal zone
boarder conflicts, its call for international co-operation for species protections seem to go unheard.49 This may be a flaw of the international
convention itself; the language is broad, encouraging “conservation and
sustainable use” without clear terms or goals.50 Moreover, conservation
pacts, like UNCLOS, rely on voluntary compliance and have minimal enforcement mechanisms, which monitor, regulate, and penalize noncompliant behavior.51 Even as nations have signed onto UNCLOS and the
Fish Stocks Agreement, overfishing, unsustainable practices, and use of unsafe fishing gear—all of which are responsible for by-catch—continue.52
B.

Divesting Control: Global RMFO’s and Sectoral Agreements

After UNCLOS, the international community attempted to promote targeted conservation efforts through the creation of RMFOs and
Sectoral Agreements.53 These are promoted in Article 8 of the Fish Stocks
Agreement, which requires that states cooperate “either directly or through
appropriate subregional or regional fisheries management organizations

46

Id. at 2.
Id. art. 5.
48
Id.; see generally UNCLOS, supra note 29, at art. 64, Annex 1; Howard S. Schiffman,
UNCLOS and Marine Wildlife Disputes: Big Splash or Barely a Ripple, 4 J. INT’L WILDLIFE
L. & POL’Y 257, 271 (2001) (stating “noteworthy features including the prescription of
provisional measures and the application of the precautionary approach”).
49
UNCLOS, supra note 29, at art. 59.
50
Miguel De Serpa Soares, Achieving SDG 14: The Role of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, U.N. CHRON., https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/achieving-sdg
-14-role-united-nations-convention-law-sea [https://perma.cc/FR9P-A8VK] (last visited
Mar. 11, 2022).
51
UNCLOS, supra note 29, at arts. 117–18; Wirajuda, supra note 30, at 11.
52
Pacoureau et al., supra note 1, at 571.
53
UNCLOS, supra note 29, at art. 118; see Stijn van Osch, Save Our Sharks: Using International Fisheries Law within Regional Fisheries Management Organizations to Improve
Shark Conservation, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 383, 404 (2012).
47
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or arrangements.”54 RMFOs rely on intergovernmental co-operation on
a localized level to collect data, implement regulations, and monitor
ocean resource changes.55 Collectively, RMFO members have “agreed to
cooperate—through their respective agreements—on precautionary,
science-based fisheries management within their Convention Areas to
ensure fish stock sustainability and ecosystem health.”56 RMFOs currently
exist in the North Atlantic Ocean, the Southeast Atlantic Ocean, the Southern Ocean, the South Pacific Ocean, the Southern Indian Ocean, and in
the Mediterranean and Black Seas.57 They do not currently exist in the
Arctic, Central Atlantic, or Southwest Atlantic regions.58
While RMFOs localize governance and allow regions to focus on
issues and populations specifically effecting their region, they run into
the same issues of global governance seen in UNCLOS; nations with a
vested interest in maximizing profits and fishing can prevent conservation for the entire region.59 The blue fin tuna,60 for example, is a highly
migratory species comparable both biologically and economically to elasmobranchs. RMFOs have actively tried to protect the blue fin tuna over the
previous decade.61 The International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas (“ICCAT”),62 the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission

54

See Fish Stocks, supra note 32, at arts. 7–8.
Id.; see generally Ellen Hey, The Interplay Between Multilateral Environmental and
Fisheries Law: A Struggle to Sustainably Regulate Economic Activity—Including a Case
Study of the North Sea, 54 JAPANESE Y.B. INT’L L. 190 (2011).
56
Issue Brief: International Fisheries Manager’s Response to Performance Reviews Insufficient, PEW (May 1, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue
-briefs/2019/05/international-fisheries-managers-response-to-performance-reviews-in
sufficient [https://perma.cc/T69C-PTNU].
57
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations and Deep-Sea Fisheries, FOOD & AGRIC.
ORG. U.N., http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/166304/en [https://perma.cc/U22E-UDQM]
(last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
58
Id.
59
See Porter, supra note 17, at 248–49; SAMUEL BARKIN & ELIZABETH DESOMBRE, CENTER
FOR GOVERNANCE & SUSTAINABILITY, UNIV. MASS. BOS., BRIEF 8: INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES
GOVERNANCE THAT WORKS: THE CASE FOR A GLOBAL FISHERIES ORGANIZATION 2 (2013).
60
The Bluefin Tuna will come up often throughout this Article, in part because its story—
as well as the United States’ reaction to tuna production and by-catch—highlight the best
path forward for elasmobranch protection.
61
Dale S. Kolody et al., Modelling Growth in Tuna RFMO Stock Assessments: Current
Approaches and Challenges, 180 FISHERIES RSCH. 177, 177–78 (2016).
62
Members include Albania, Algeria, Angola, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde,
China, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, European Community, France (St.
Pierre & Miquelon), Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iceland, Japan, South
Korea, Libya, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama,
55
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(“IATTC”),63 and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission
(“WCPFC”)64 were all formed specifically to regulate tuna catch and to
guarantee sustainable fishing of the species.65 Yet, the profitability of tuna
is one reason RMFOs have failed to protect its population numbers.66
While these bodies have set catch limits, those limits do not encourage
population growth.67 They still allow for overfishing, giving nations larger
tuna catch numbers than feasible, and allowing overfishing in the name
of profit.68 Moreover, protective measures including by-catch regulations,
traceability of supply chain, and enforceability mechanisms have not
been a priority.69
Philippines, Russia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, St. Tome and Principe, St. Vincent
and the Grenadines, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom (Overseas Territories), United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. See International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, INT’L WATERS GOVERNANCE, http://www
.internationalwatersgovernance.com/international-commission-for-the-conservation-of
-atlantic-tunas-iccat.html [https://perma.cc/YM7A-2L78] (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
63
“Under this provision Panama adhered in 1953, Ecuador in 1961, Mexico in 1964, Canada
in 1968, Japan in 1970, France and Nicaragua in 1973, Vanuatu in 1990, Venezuela in 1992,
El Salvador in 1997, and Guatemala in 2000. Canada withdrew from the Commission in
1984.” William Bayliff, INTER-AMERICAN TROPICAL TUNA COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT
13: ORGANIZATIONS, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TROPICAL
TUNA COMMISSION, 1 (2001).
64
Parties are Australia, China, Canada, the Cook Islands, the European Community, the
Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, South Korea, the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
Philippines, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Chinese Taipei (as a fishing entity), Tonga,
Tuvalu, the United States, and Vanuatu. In addition, American Samoa, the Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Tokelau, and
Wallis and Fatuna are Participating Territories. Belize, Indonesia, Senegal, Mexico, El
Salvador, Ecuador, and Vietnam are Cooperating Non-Members. About WCPFC, W. &
CENT. PAC. FISHERIES COMM’N (Feb. 4, 2022), https://www.wcpfc.int/about-wcpfc [https://
perma.cc/Q6FJ-DDFL].
65
International and Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Aug. 8, 2021), https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/international-affairs/inter
national-and-regional-fisheries-management-organizations [https://perma.cc/U32A-LT9G].
66
Grantly Galland, To Slow Decline of Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, Fishery Managers
Must Lower Quota, PEW (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-anal
ysis/articles/2020/10/29/to-slow-decline-of-western-atlantic-bluefin-tuna-fishery-man
agers-must-lower-quota [https://perma.cc/6973-PWSK]; Chris Chase, NGOs Critical of
ICCAT Rollover of Western Atlantic Bluefin Quota, SEAFOOD SOURCE (Jan. 28, 2020), https://
www.seafoodsource.com/news/environment-sustainability/iccat-roll-over-of-western-at
lantic-bluefin-quota-has-ngos-crying-foul [https://perma.cc/26BU-HD26].
67
See Galland, supra note 66.
68
Howard S. Schiffman, The Southern Bluefin Tuna case: ITLOS Hears Its First Fishery
Dispute, 2 J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 318, 319 (1999).
69
See van Osch, supra note 53, at 388–90.
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This type of diplomatic divide that prevents conservation is also
seen in the relatively successful International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (“ICW”).70 The ICW, formed after World War II, attempts
to reduce whale hunting and restore endangered populations by setting
catch quotas and gear limits, and “adopt[ing] regulations with respect to
the conservation and utilization of whale resources.”71 In 1982, the ICW
passed an amendment which outlined that “the catch limits for the killing
for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks . . . shall be zero.”72
However, in the name of international diplomacy and co-operation, nations
can object to this amendment upon entering the convention, effectively
allowing nations to avoid the ban either by objection or scientific exception.73 While the successes and failures of the ICW are beyond the scope
of this Article, the conflict between anti-whaling nations and pro-whaling
nations highlights how national interest can prevent widespread international conservation efforts.74 Even with the complete ban, a reported 1,128
whales were killed by ten member nations in 2019,75 with some researchers estimating an unreported higher count throughout history.76
70

International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716,
161 U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter ICW].
71
Id. art. V(1).
72
Schedule to the ICW, As Amended by the Commission at the 67th Meeting, Sept. 2018,
at 10(d); see also INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION 5 (2006); Michael Bowman, Normalizing the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 293, 294 (2008).
73
See Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening, International Court of Justice (Order
of Feb. 6, 2013).
74
Tara Jordan, Revising the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling: A
Proposal to End the Stalemate Within the International Whaling Commission, 29 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 833, 836 (2012); see also Monder Khoury, Whaling in Circles: The Makahs, the
International Whaling Commission, and Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling, 67 HASTINGS
L.J. 293, 295 (2015) (for an approach to whaling regulations for indigenous peoples).
75
See The International Whaling Commission, Total Catches: Data Set (Rows-2019),
https://iwc.int/total-catches [https://perma.cc/G3PA-SRZH] (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
76
See Hope M. Babcock, Why Changing Norms is a More Just Solution to the Failed International Regulatory Regime to Protect Whales than a Trading Program in Whale Shares,
32 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 3, 14 (2013) (stating, for example that in the years of the Soviet Union,
numbers were drastically underreported: “The Soviet Union was the most egregious
violator: their whaling fleets between 1948 and 1973 ‘killed a vast number of the world’s
“ostensibly protected whale populations”’ and then under-reported to the IWC the
number of whales killed. . . . ‘[T]he USSR officially reported killing only 2,710 humpback
whales to the IWC rather than the 48,477 its industry actually killed’ . . . ‘[T]he USSR’s
false reporting was so drastic and pervasive that some experts believe it accounts for the
persistent inaccuracy of the IWC Scientific Committee’s forecasts of whale populations,
on which the catch limits were based.’”) (internal citations omitted).
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RMFOs and sectoral agreements, like UNCLOS, establish international norms and processes, but do not offer a meaningful path for conservation prioritizing nations. Elasmobranchs are specifically protected
under RMFOs, but no international species-specific convention—like the
whaling convention—exists.77 Even if one was created, the role of international co-operation and national prioritization of profits leaves gaps
allowing for overfishing, by-catch, and lack of regulation or enforcement.78
Instead, shark and ray populations are largely protected under international trade law.79 The next section examines the international trade
protections for endangered species, which aim to strengthen conservation
by minimizing profit potential.
C.

Using Trade Laws: The United Nations Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Flora and Fauna

The international community has used, with limited success,
trade regulations to promote sustainability. These regulations, which
limit market interests and profits instead of attempting to balance those
interests with conservation, are the most promising way forward. The
source of this regulatory scheme is CITES.80 CITES is a global compact
which regulates international and domestic trade of endangered species
of wild animals and plants.81 The bulk of the convention was created by
eighty participating nations during the Washington Conference in 1973.82
CITES opened for signature in 1974, and since then 183 parties, including
the regional economic block of the European Union,83 have signed onto
the convention, making it not only one of the oldest international conventions, but one of the most popular.84
The goal of the CITES convention is to end the exploitation of
oceanic species.85 This is to be done through a standard process, where
77

See van Osch, supra note 53, at 404–05.
Id. at 388–90.
79
Id. at 402–05.
80
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter U.N. CITES].
81
Id.
82
Id. at 393.
83
Amendment to the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora, Apr. 30, 1983, Senate Treaty Doc. No. 98-10.
84
List of Parties to the Convention, CITES, https://cites.org/eng/disc/parties/index.php
[https://perma.cc/DSZ8-XE4W] (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
85
U.N. CITES, supra note 80.
78

2022]

STUCK IN THE NET

793

all international import, export, and reimportation of species covered
through CITES are subject to licensing and trade provisions86 that also
apply to non-member states.87 Over 35,000 species of plants and animals
are protected under CITES.88 CITES protection includes forty-six species
of rays and sharks, yet, as discussed below, these are relatively recent
additions to the convention.89
CITES works through three main processes: the classification of
species into appendix groups; the adaptation of the convention into national laws; and, finally, enforcement.90 Species are broken into one of three
Appendices.91 The Appendices define the terms for which trade countries
must abide, which apply to “the whole, live or dead” species listed.92 Appendix I prohibits international commercial trade of listed species, unless
there are exceptional circumstances.93 Species on this list are “threatened
with extinction,” and considered “the most endangered among CITES-listed
animals and plants.”94 This list notably includes gorillas, sea turtles,
giant pandas, lady slipper orchids, and, recently, giant manta rays.95 Exceptions are granted for instances where the “purpose of the import is not
commercial in nature,” usually allowing for scientific research.96 Parties
to this convention must require import, export, and reimport permits to
trade any of these species, approved by the “management authority and
scientific authority” of the party.97

86

Id.
Non-member states currently include Korea, Micronesia, Haiti, Kiribati, Nauru, The
Marshall Islands, Faroe Islands, Andorra, South Sudan, East Timor, Turkmenistan,
Tuvalu, and the U.N. Observed the Holy See. See signatories to the U.N. CITES, supra
note 80.
88
U.N. CITES, supra note 80, at app. I–III.
89
Id.; see infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
90
U.N. CITES, supra note 80, at arts. II, VI, XVIII.
91
Id. app. I–III.
92
U.N. Convention on Int’l Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna
(CITES), Appendices I–III (June 2021), [hereinafter CITES Appendices I–III], https://
cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/app/2021/E-Appendices-2021-06-22.pdf [https://perma.cc
/5RTE-LAGN].
93
Id.; see U.N. CITES, supra note 80, at art. II(1).
94
See U.N. CITES, supra note 80, at app. I; The CITES Appendices, CITES [hereinafter
The CITES Appendices], https://cites.org/eng/app/index.php [https://perma.cc/VU59-Y4ZN]
(last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
95
How CITES Works, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVS., https://www.fws.gov/international
/cites/how-cites-works.html [https://perma.cc/F43J-WL7F] (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
96
The CITES Appendices, supra note 94.
97
Id. In the United States, this is done through the Secretary of the Interior. See Kathryn
87

794

WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 46:781

Appendix II controls trade under specific conditions.98 Animals
included in this appendix include “species that although currently not
threatened with extinction, may become so without trade controls.”99 Interestingly, species may be included on this list, not because of its own endangered status, but because they resemble other Appendix I or Appendix II
animals (referred to as “look-like species”), and regulation is enforced to
effectively control trade of the impacted species.100 Two similar-looking fish,
for example, may both be listed even if one fish is abundant and the other
is endangered.101 Appendix II is the most heavily populated CITES
appendix, currently listing 34,419 of the roughly 35,000 species.102 International trade of these species is authorized by import or export certificates,
but no permit is required.103 The authorization and certification process
is similar to that of Appendix I, through the nation’s relevant management and scientific authorities, with the understanding that trade is allowed if it is believed it will “not be detrimental to the survival of the
species in the wild.”104
Finally, Appendix III requires certification of origin to trade, usually
at the request of a singular member state.105 Species on this list are
added at the request of a party who believes international co-operation
is required to better regulate trade in their own nation.106 As of 2021, there
are twenty-seven animals and one plant species listed in Appendix III, including map turtles, walruses, and cap stag beetles.107 If granted Appendix III status, importation, exportation, and reimportation of these species
requires permits or certificates from national governments.108
Enforcement of CITES is multifaceted, including promoting of
national law review, committee review, and suspended trade and sanctions.109 While not written into the original text of the convention, the
A. Saterson, Government Legislation and Regulations in the United States, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF BIODIVERSITY 712, 714 (Simon A. Levin ed., 2d ed. 2013).
98
See U.N. CITES, supra note 80, at app. II.
99
Id.; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVS., supra note 95.
100
See U.N. CITES, supra note 80, at app. II; The CITES Appendices, supra note 94.
101
See U.N. CITES, supra note 80, at App. II, Art. IV.
102
Id.
103
See id. app. II; The CITES Appendices, supra note 94.
104
U.N. CITES, supra note 80, at app. II; The CITES Appendices, supra note 94.
105
U.N. CITES, supra note 80, at app. II–III.
106
Id.
107
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVS., supra note 95.
108
The CITES Appendices, supra note 94.
109
CITES SECRETARIAT, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, CITES COMPLIANCE AND
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enforcement language around “collective retorsion” developed through
resolutions into a system of suspended trade and sanctions for noncompliance.110 Article XIV.1(a) of the convention allows nations to develop
“stricter domestic measures regarding the conditions for trade, taking, possession or transport of specimens of species included in Appendices I, II,
and III, or the complete prohibition thereof.”111 Applying this language,
nations can levy, and are in some ways encouraged to use, unilateral
sanctions against nations for non-compliance, as long as it is not done in
violation of international law norms.112 International conventions are
often criticized for lacking enforcement mechanisms, which CITES offers
through a suspend trade system.113 This is critical for the protection of
sharks and rays since CITES not only offers a monitoring process, but
also a path to economically induce compliance.114
CITES has not focused on shark and ray populations over the
previous years. While overfishing and increased demand seem to be
present throughout the previous half decade, the first shark introduced
to the CITES appendix did not occur until 2003.115 Since then, although
there are over 1,000 species of sharks and rays, only a select few have
been listed in Appendices I, II, and III.116 Around the same time, the FAO
ENFORCEMENT REGIME 9 (2012), https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/abs/absem-comp-01
/other/absem-comp-01-presentation-cites-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/BN6X-8P3Z].
110
See Peter Sands, Enforcing CITES: The Rise and Fall of Trade Sanctions, 22 REV. EUR.
CMTY. & INT’L ENV’T L. 251, 251 (2013). Collective retorsion is a method of international
enforcement defined as “an unfriendly act made in response to an injurious act done by
another state,” which includes sanctions, trade bans, travel bans, and removal of aid. JAN
KLABBERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 184 (3rd ed. 2020).
111
U.N. CITES, supra note 80, at art. XIV(1)(a).
112
See id.
113
The Parties shall take appropriate measures to enforce the provisions
of the present Convention and to prohibit trade in specimens in violation thereof. These shall include measures: (a) to penalize trade in,
or possession of, such specimens, or both; and (b) to provide for the
confiscation or return to the State of export of such specimens.
Id. art. VII.
114
See generally id.
115
Snyder, supra note 25, at 219–21.
116
U.N. CITES, supra note 80, at app. II; see also Rebecca Pollack, Cites COP17 Review,
23 ANIMAL L. 539, 547 (2017) (“Sharks, specifically basking and whale sharks, were first
added to Appendix II in February 2003, because, while sharks were not threatened with
extinction, their trade needed to be ‘controlled to avoid utilization incompatible with their
survival.’ Since initially adding basking sharks and whale sharks at the 12th Meeting of
the Conference of the Parties (CoP12) in 2003, the Parties have added six shark species
to Appendix II, for a total of eight, along with all manta rays and sawfish belonging to the
Elasmobranchii subclass.”).
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drafted, with the encouragement of CITES, an “International Plan of
Action for the Conservation and Management of Sharks” (“IPOASharks”),117 which is “a voluntary instrument that applies to all States
whose fishermen engage in shark fisheries.”118 This plan “sets out a set
of activities which implementing States are expected to carry out, including an assessment of whether a problem exists with respect to sharks,
adopting a National Plan of Action for the conservation and management
of sharks (“NPOA-SHARKS”), as well as procedures for national reviews
and reporting requirements.”119 Actions taken, however, are non-binding
and have been criticized as ineffective by CITES parties.120
Since 2000, CITES has adopted resolutions at every conference,
calling for greater protection of elasmobranchs.121 In 2002, Resolution
12.6 called for “species-specific recommendations on improving the conservation status of sharks and the regulation of international trade in
these species.”122 In 2004, the same resolution found and reported “[n]ot
much evidence of improved shark fishery management,” even with
double the number of parties reporting progress towards IPOA-Sharks
goals.123 In 2007, “[f]urther extensive program of work on sharks was
agreed—for Parties, the Secretariat and Animals Committee,” and in
2010, CITES’ rules on elasmobranchs were updated to “[e]xpress . . .
continued concern at unsustainable trade and insufficient progress with
IPOA-Shark.”124
117

Pollack, supra note 116, at 547–48; U.N. CITES, supra note 80, at app. II.
FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL
PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF SHARKS at iv (1999).
119
The IPOA-SHARKS is a voluntary instrument that applies to all States
whose fishermen engage in shark fisheries. The text sets out a set of
activities which implementing States are expected to carry out, including an assessment of whether a problem exists with respect to
sharks, adopting a National Plan of Action for the conservation and
management of sharks (NPOA-SHARKS), as well as procedures for
national reviews and reporting requirements. The calendar years by
when these actions preferably should have been taken, are indicated.
Id.
120
See Mary Lack & Glenn Sant, The Future of Sharks: A Review of Action and Inaction,
THE PEW ENV’T GRP., Jan. 2011 at 2–3.
121
History of CITES Listing of Sharks and Manta Rays, U.N. CITES, https://cites.org/eng
/prog/shark/history_old.php [https://perma.cc/WDX6-MB88] (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
122
Id.; U.N. Convention on Int’l Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES), Conference of the Parties Res. Conf. 12.6 (Rev. CoP18) (2002).
123
See History of Cites Listing of Sharks and Manta Rays, CITES, https://cites.org/eng
/prog/shark/history_old.php [https://perma.cc/MU2L-BCJB] (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
124
See id.
118
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In the last decade, the number of species of sharks and rays included in the appendices of CITES has been expanded.125 2013’s Conference finally drafted into Appendix II the inclusion of Oceanic Whitetip
Sharks, Hammerheads, Porbeagles, and Manta Rays, and also drafted
Sawfish into Appendix I.126 In 2016, the committee included Thresher
Sharks and Silky Sharks in Appendix II,127 and added Mako Sharks,
Giant Guitarfish, and Wedge Fish in 2019.128 This was celebrated as progress by some conservation groups.129 However, as of 2021, despite 35,000
species covered by CITES, only 46 out of the nearly 1,000 species of sharks
or rays have been protected.130 Out of the 46 protected, only the 5 species
of sawfish are completely protected under Appendix I.131
Adding species to U.N. CITES is particularly challenging, as it
requires international motivation for conservation to outweigh profit,
which can work against the interests of more conservation friendly nations,
like the United States.132 The Bluefin Tuna, for example, is the perfect example of the limitations of CITES.133 Shortly after Sawfish were introduced
to the CITES Appendices, the United States, among others, pushed for
the protection of the Atlantic and Mediterranean Bluefin Tuna since
125

See U.N. Convention on Int’l Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna
(CITES) CoP15, Props. 15–18 (Mar. 2010).
126
CITES, supra note 123.
127
See U.N., Convention on Int’l Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna
(CITES), Consideration of Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II, CoP18 Props.
42–45 (Sep.–Oct. 2016) (adding Silky Sharks (Prop. 42), Thresher Sharks (Prop. 43),
Devil Rays (Prop. 44), and Ocellate River Stingrays (Prop. 45)).
128
U.N., Convention on Int’l Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna
(CITES), Consideration of Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II, CoP18 Props.
42–44 (May–June 2019) (adding Mako Shark (Prop. 42), Guitarfish (Prop. 43), and Wedge
Fish (Prop. 44)).
129
See 18 Shark & Ray Species Granted New Global Trade Controls at Wildlife Conference, SHARKTRUST (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.sharktrust.org/News/cites-2019 [https://
perma.cc/8GNS-Y8MC].
130
See CITES Appendices I–III, supra note 92.
131
See Snyder, supra note 25, at 226 (“The United States has been one of the world
leaders in shark conservation. For a country as large and politically impactful as the
United States, not much international shark conservation could be enacted if it was not
an active participant and leader along its own coastlines.”); Taiga Takahashi, Left Out at
Sea: Highly Migratory Fish and the Endangered Species Act, 99 CAL. L. REV. 179, 226 (2011).
132
See Galland, supra note 66; Melissa Blue Sky, Getting on the List: Politics and Procedural Maneuvering in CITES Appendix I and II Decisions for Commercially Exploited
Marine and Timber Species, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 35, 40 (2010).
133
See U.N. Convention on Int’l Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna
(CITES) CoP15, Prop. 19 (Mar. 2010) (rejected by majority vote) [hereinafter CITES
CoP15, Prop. 19].
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overfishing was leading to a rapid population decline.134 With one single
fish reportedly selling for upwards of $3,000,000 USD,135 inclusion of the
tuna species in CITES Appendix I or II would limit the profitability of
nations with large tuna industries.136 Predictably, this financial interest
outweighed conservation motives, and the proposal to include the Bluefin
Tuna was denied.137 The United States turned instead to national regulations to enforce conservation of the tuna, as discussed below.138
CITES’ emphasis on trade and preventing profit-based interests
from harming endangered species is the most direct and effective approach
to international ocean management.139 Yet, the reality is that U.N.
CITES international co-operation and enforcement mechanisms offer a
solution to population decline of sharks and rays only if greater species
protection becomes available.140 Protection mechanisms are currently,
however, critically underused.141 Moreover, the convention does not cover
domestic fishing, trade, or by-catch, all of which are major causes of
population decrease.142
II.

DOMESTIC REGULATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE IMPORT OF SPECIES

As international co-operation for species protection becomes increasingly limited by objecting nations, the United States has moved to
relying on domestic trade laws on the import of sustainable seafood as its
method of filling gaps and enforcing ocean protections abroad.143 This
134

See id.; see also Press Release: Bluefin Tuna Main Course of CITES World Conference,
CITES, https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/15/prop/E-15-Prop-19.pdf [https://perma
.cc/3S5K-PGB4] (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
135
Tuna Sells for Record $3 Million in Auction at Tokyo’s New Fish Market, CNBC (Jan. 5,
2019, 7:17 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/05/tuna-sells-for-record-3-million-in-auc
tion-at-tokyos-new-fish-market.html [https://perma.cc/82JH-XB89].
136
See CITES CoP15, Prop. 19, supra note 133.
137
See id.; U.N. Convention on Int’l Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna
(CITES) CoP15, Final Decisions on the Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II
(Mar. 2010).
138
See infra Part II.
139
See generally U.N. Convention on Int’l Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna (CITES), Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
140
See Murdock, supra note 6.
141
Id.
142
See Oliver et al., supra note 18, at 86; Davidson et al., supra note 10, at 439.
143
See generally Kaitlin M. Wojnar, Shark Laws with Teeth: How Deep Can U.S. Conservation Laws Cut into Global Trade Regulations?, 19 ANIMAL L. 185, 186–89 (2012); see
generally F. K. Killingsworth, Import Control Under Federal Laws, 2 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.Q. 498 (1947) (explaining the backbones of national trade law).
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approach directly targets one of the largest motivators for other nations
to leave gaps in international law—profit. The United States’ seafood
imports have tripled in the previous two decades, creating a more than
$20,000,000 USD industry as of 2016.144 The United States has its own
fishing sustainability laws, largely enacted through the Magnuson-Stevens
Act145 and National Standard 4, which promotes conservation.146 However, according to the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA Fisheries”) an estimated eighty percent of the seafood
consumed in the United States is imported.147 By setting standards that
require imported seafood to maintain the same standards of sustainability as locally caught seafood, the United States introduced profit-based
regulations into the international market, filling gaps left in international law.148 This section examines the strength of some of the United
States’ import laws before Part III, suggesting key improvements that
will benefit elasmobranch population growth.
The United States’ laws regulating the import of wildlife, including
ocean life, are as old as environmental law itself.149 The first U.S. federal
law protecting wildlife, the 1990 Lacey Act, made it “unlawful to import,
export, sell, acquire, or purchase fish, wildlife or plants . . . in violation
of U.S. or Indian Law.”150 The law protected CITES animals, as well as
animals protected under state law, through enforcement of civil and
criminal penalties.151 Moreover, the Lacey Act does not stand alone. In
the previous half century, the United States has implemented a series of
conservation laws regulating the import of oceanic creatures.152 The Pelly
Amendment, passed in 1954, allows for restrictions on importation, and

144

USA Fisheries Statistics: Production, Consumption, and Trade, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG.

OF THE U.N., http://www.fao.org/in-action/globefish/countries/countries/usa/usa-trade/en/

[https://perma.cc/ME7R-H2AZ] (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
145
See The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1801–1891(d) (2014).
146
National Standard 4 Allocations, 50 C.F.R. § 6000.325.
147
FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., supra note 144.
148
Wojnar, supra note 143, at 204–05.
149
See, e.g., Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–78 (Amend. 2008); Pelly Amendment, 22 U.S.C.
§ 1978; The Endangered Species Act as Amended by Public Law 97-304 (the Endangered
Species Act Amendments of 1982) (Washington, U.S. G.P.O., 1983); The MagnusonStevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1801–1891(d) (2014).
150
Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–78 (Amend. 2008).
151
See id.
152
See Wojnar, supra note 143, at 189–91; FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., supra note
144.
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embargos on wildlife products, from nations that violate international
fishery regulations or harm threatened species.153 The Endangered Species
Act (“ESA”), passed in 1966, creates a list of federally protected endangered animals, for which it is:
Unlawful to import or export; deliver, receive, carry, transport, or ship in interstate or foreign commerce in the course
of a commercial activity; sell or offer for sale in interstate
or foreign commerce; take . . . on the high seas; possess,
ship, deliver, carry, transport, sell, or receive unlawfully
taken wildlife.154
The ESA has been heralded as successful in maintaining populations
through trade and national controls, covering over 2,000 threatened and
endangered species.155 However, to date, it only includes eleven shark
species, one ray species, and no skate species.156 These additions are relatively new.157 Prior to 2011, the ESA was criticized for not including a
single highly migratory fish.158
Finally, the Marine Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”), enacted
in 1972, requires any country exporting fish to the United States to have
marine mammal protections equivalent to those in the United States.159
The MMPA also includes import provisions that specifically address bycatch:
•

153

“The Secretary of the Treasury shall ban the importation of commercial fish or products from fish

Pelly Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1954) (stating presidential prohibition through
a “certification” process can ban trade of species).
154
See The Endangered Species Act as Amended by Public Law 97-304 (the Endangered
Species Act Amendments of 1982), 16 U.S.C. § 1538; Endangered Species, Permits: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. FISH &WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/endangered/per
mits/faq.html#:~:text=The%20Endangered%20Species%20Act%20(ESA,%2C%20wound%2C
%20kill%2C%20trap%2C [https://perma.cc/JW5Y-NP6D] (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
155
See Oliver A. Houck, Reflections on the Endangered Species Act, 25 NW. SCH. L. LEWIS
& CLARK COLL. ENV’T L. 689, 689 (1995); Takahashi, supra note 131, at 179, 187.
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Endangered Species Act Threatened and Endangered Species Directory, NAT’L OCEANIC
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/species-directory/threatened-en
dangered [https://perma.cc/56QS-KRUP] (under “Species Category” choose “Fish & Sharks”;
then click “Search”) (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
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which have been caught with commercial fishing
technology which results in the incidental kill or
incidental serious injury of ocean mammals in excess of United States standards,”160 and
“[t]he List of Foreign Fisheries will be organized by
harvesting nation and other defining factors including geographic location of harvest, gear-type,
target species or a combination thereof. Based upon
the List of Foreign Fisheries, the Assistant Administrator will consult with harvesting nations, informing them of the regulatory requirements for
exempt and export fisheries to import fish and fish
products into the United States.”161

While the MMPA does not apply to elasmobranchs, since they are not
mammals, it does provide an interesting framework for sustainability by
requiring imported seafood to maintain the same mammal protection
standards as the United States.162
Recently, state and federal laws have turned their focus to specific
areas of elasmobranch conservation not addressed by international regulations: the shark trade, by-catch, and traceability of sources.163 For example, while shark finning has been largely prohibited in the United States
since the Federal Shark Conservation Act of 2011, the international market
continued to export shark fins to the U.S. market.164 In response, fourteen states and territories, including California, Hawaii, Delaware, Guam,
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, American Samoa, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas,
Florida, and Washington, implemented state level prohibitions against the
possession and sale of shark fins.165
160

Id.
List of Foreign Fisheries, 82 Fed. Reg. 2961 (Jan. 10, 2017)
162
See id.; see also Tatum, supra note 11, at 3.
163
See, e.g., International Fisheries Agreement Clarification Act (Shark Conservation Act
of 2010), 124 Stat § 3668 (Amending 16 U.S.C. § 1826 (i–k) (2011)) [hereinafter International Fisheries Agreement]; Elizabeth Neville, Note, Shark Finning: A Ban to Change
the Tide of Extinction, 25 COLO. NAT. RES. ENERGY & ENV’T L. REV. 387, 395 (2014).
164
International Fisheries Agreement, supra note 163.
165
Neville, supra note 163, at 388, 395; see, e.g., A.B. 376, Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011)
(California shark fin ban); S.B. 2169 CD1. DOC, Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2010) (Hawaii
shark fin ban); Adm. C. 3000, 3500, Tit., 7 (Del. 2021) (Delaware shark fin ban); S1711B,
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013) (New York shark fin ban).
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To address by-catch, the use of “driftnets”—the type of net most
associated with elasmobranch by-catch—has been banned across the
United States, with the exception of California Federal Waters.166 A ban
on driftnet use in California federal waters was introduced in Congress in
2020, and was passed by both the House of Representatives and Senate,
before being vetoed by then President Trump.167 These driftnet prohibitory laws, while they do not directly target international trade, create a
national standard of sustainability that, if expanded, could prevent import and thereby meaningfully protect shark and ray populations.168
While international law continues to prioritize profit over conservation, U.S. federal laws set tighter regulations on ocean use, including
elasmobranch specific language.169 However, while national regulations
on oceanic mammals are automatically applied to international import
through the MMPA, shark and ray protections remain more erratic.170
These laws leave a smaller gap; they offer more domestic protections for
elasmobranchs, yet they still leave international holes big enough for
sharks to swim through. The next section addresses how expanding U.S.
import laws could fill these gaps through bans, by-catch regulations, and
traceability.
III.

EXPANDING U.S. IMPORT LAWS TO FILL THE GAPS

U.S. law protects elasmobranch species in federal waters, but international law still does not prioritize their conservation. To successfully promote the growth of shark and ray populations, the United States
should use its market power to prevent non-sustainably harvested seafood
from being sold in the United States. For sharks and rays, this can be
accomplished by banning imports, setting sustainable by-catch regulations, and creating species specific labelling and supply chain monitoring.
A.

Banning Import of Types of Elasmobranchs

The first, most simple and direct method of promoting elasmobranch
population growth is to simply remove it as an option on the U.S. market.
166

See Driftnet Modernization Act, S. 906, 116th Cong. (2019) (did not pass); S.B. 1017,
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See id.
169
See, e.g., id.
170
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Some forms of prohibition already exist; shark finning is illegal in U.S.
waters,171 species listed on CITES Appendix I or II are only allowed to be
imported with a permit,172 and fourteen states have banned the sale of
shark fins completely.173 Yet, a market still exists; consumers have largely
turned to international markets for fin imports.174 FAO estimates that
over a thousand metric tons of shark fins were imported into the United
States in 2007.175 The National Resource Defense Council (“NRDC”) estimates that “[f]rom 2010 to 2017, the United States unintentionally played
middleman to somewhere between 650 and 772 tons of shark fin exports,
accounting for as many as 1.29 million sharks.”176
Efforts have been made to ban import of elasmobranchs to the
United States. In 2019, U.S. Representatives Gregorio Kilili Camacho
Sablan and Michael McCaul brought forward the Shark Fin Sales Elimination Act of 2019, which incorporates a trade ban on finning into federal
law.177 The law directly prohibits the import of sharks’ fins from endangered or threatened species, or import from countries without existing
shark finning laws.178 The Shark Fin Sales Elimination Act also protected
rays and skates by including them in the national seafood traceability
171

Shark Fin Trade Elimination Act of 2017, S. 793, 115th Cong. (2017); Shark Fin Sales
Elimination Act of 2019, H.R. 737, 116th Cong.; see generally United States v. Approximately 64,695 Pounds of Shark Fin, 520 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2007); see generally Chinatown
Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 794 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2015).
172
U.N. CITES, supra note 80, at apps. I, IV (“A Management Authority of the State of
import of any specimen shall cancel and retain the export permit or re-export certificate
and any corresponding import permit presented in respect of the import of that specimen.”):
The provisions of the present Convention shall in no way affect the
right of Parties to adopt: (a) stricter domestic measures regarding the
conditions for trade, taking, possession or transport of specimens of
species included in Appendices I, II and III, or the complete prohibition
thereof; or (b) domestic measures restricting or prohibiting trade,
taking, possession or transport of species not included in Appendix I,
II or III.
Id. app. XIV.
173
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program, which would keep track of imported elasmobranchs.179 While
the bill passed the House in 2019, it never passed the senate.180
This leaves the United States with a legal double standard. While
shark finning is banned in the United States, import is still largely legal
since most forms of sharks are not covered by the ESA, CITES, or banned
by the remaining thirty-six states.181 Rays and skates are offered even
less protection.182 At the same time, the United States recognizes the
vulnerability of these highly migratory species in its own national conservation regulations.183 Unlike mammals, whose import is offered a duality
with national laws under the MMPA, elasmobranch import is allowed
even when national catch is not.184 The solution to this problematic
standard is twofold. First, federal import bans on elasmobranchs should
be pursued through either new congressional legislation or through the
Pelly Amendment. Second, a greater number of elasmobranch species
should be covered in the ESA, recognizing the important role they play
in ecosystems as well as the need for international recovery. Finally, as
suggested again below, the MMPA should be expanded, or an equivalent
be developed, to ensure national standards to protect elasmobranchs will
apply to imports as well.
B.

Improving By-Catch Import Regulations and Labelling
Requirements

The second method of combatting international elasmobranch population decline is to directly target the ill effects of by-catch, which as of
2019, was responsible for between thirty and fifty percent of population decline.185 There are a few methods of tackling the international by-catch
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(2009). But see Oliver et al., supra note 18, at 87 (“Approximately 50% of the global shark
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fisheries. Elasmobranch bycatch is rarely recorded at the species level in official fishery
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problem by using trade laws, including, potentially banning import of
high-by-catch seafood, implementing international import standards for
fishing gear, and creating general or elasmobranch specific labelling
processes for imported seafood.186
Using U.S. import laws to stop by-catch is nuanced and first requires an examination of how by-catch occurs. For elasmobranchs, certain
types of netting are extremely lethal.187 Gillnets, trawlers, purse seine
nets, and long lines all have heavy shark and ray by-catch rates due to
their expansive nature.188 Gillnets, for example, are mesh walls attached
to poles or free floating, which catch targeted species by entangling them
in the small holes.189 This type of net makes up about four percent of
global catch, with thirty-four percent coming from the Indian Ocean tuna
catch.190 Yet it has a capture mortality rate of seventy percent for any
elasmobranchs caught,191 especially in smaller mesh gillnets.192 Long line
fishing, which leaves a long trail of baited hooks attached to a single line,
is also incredibly deadly for sharks, which, as predators, are drawn to the
fish caught on long lines.193 This form of fishing is indiscriminate in what
it catches, often resulting in the by-catch of juvenile elasmobranchs in
addition to adults.194 Trawlers and purse seine nets also have high bycatch rates, with one 2015 study finding “pelagic longlines, and deep-sea
and coastal trawl fisheries had the largest total annual shark and ray
bycatch, respectively” with coastal trawl fisheries having “substantial
shark bycatch ratios.”195
The United States has addressed by-catch in its national waters
by banning the majority of gillnet use, and by implementing by-catch
from reported annual landings is likely to result in a significant underestimation of the
true magnitude of fishing-related mortality.”).
186
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187
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standards.196 On an international level, some fisheries have successfully
avoided endangered species by-catch simply by adjusting their fishing
methods to account for the reaction of a specific animal.197 Fisheries who
are “dolphin safe” avoid dolphins, whales, and other oxygen breathing bycatch by lowering nets a few feet off the ocean surface, allowing animals
who swim up to the net, when threatened, to escape through the gap.198
Fisheries attempting to avoid catching endangered cod species raise trawler
nets a few feet off the ocean floor, since bottom dwellers like cod instinctively swim down when threatened.199 Not enough research currently
exists on elasmobranchs to make a determinative call—but the process
of “keeping an eye out” for these species alone could make a difference,
even if small.
Moreover, in recent years, fisheries have developed netting and
technology to reduce by-catch, specifically in large and migratory animals. In India, fisheries created a “Dolphin Wall Net” that is deployed
before releasing a seine net, preventing dolphins from approaching and
getting tangled in the web.200 As turtles were increasingly found caught
in trawler shrimp fishing nets, and global outrage grew, the fishing
industry introduced the use of Turtle Excluder Devices (“TEDs”).201 TED
fishing nets have a metal grid with an ejection mechanism separating the
wide netting at the front of the trawl from the narrow netting, called the
“bag” at the end of the trawl.202 The design allows small oceanic animals,
like shrimp, to pass through the bars into the bag, while preventing bycatch of turtles—and sharks—who get ejected from the net on contact
with the grid.203 Technological advancements to prevent by-catch are
196
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possible and should be highly encouraged under international and national standards of sustainability.
For elasmobranchs, methods that could minimize by-catch currently exist. The existing technology of TEDs can be used to protect larger
species of sharks and rays from fisheries targeting smaller animals.204 A
2018 study of fisheries in Australia found that attaching store bought
magnets to the entrance of fishing nets effectively decreased elasmobranch by-catch by thirty percent.205 Sharks and rays are biologically
more sensitive to electromagnetic fields than fish, due to a sensory organ
referred to as the ampullae of Lorenzini, alerting them to the magnets,
and therefore the existence of a net before they are caught.206
When filling the gaps in international law that fail to protect elasmobranch by-catch, the United States should focus on existing protective
practices and technology. Fishing regulations dedicated to ending elasmobranch by-catch could, if taking the most efficient route, prohibit import
from nations without existing by-catch laws, or from fisheries that use
specific types of netting. The inclusion of elasmobranchs in the MMPA
or an equivalent would promote informed fishing and increase market
pressure.207 The MMPA bans import of seafood “caught with commercial
fishing technology which results in the incidental kill or incidental serious
injury of ocean mammals in excess of U.S. standards.”208 U.S. federal laws
on by-catch currently offer more protection than international standards
for sharks, rays, and skates, including the almost complete ban of gillnets.209 By harmonizing national laws with import laws, the United States
can fill some of the remaining gaps in international law that continue to
be a barrier to population regrowth.210
204

Id.; David Brewer et al., The Impact of Turtle Excluder Devices and Bycatch Reduction
Devices on Diverse Tropical Marine Communities in Australia’s Northern Prawn Fishery,
81 FISHERIES RSCH. 176, 176–88 (2006).
205
R.J. Richards et al., Permanent Magnets Reduce Bycatch of Benthic Sharks in an
Ocean Trap Fishery, 208 FISHERIES RSCH. 16, 19 (2018); see also Craig O’Connell et al.,
Analysis of Permanent Magnets as Elasmobranch Bycatch Reduction Devices in Hookand-Line and Longline Trials, 109 FISHERY BULL. 394, 394–95 (2011).
206
O’Connell et al., supra note 205, at 394.
207
See generally Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 16 U.S.C. § 1371.
208
Id. § 1371(a)(2).
209
New US Regulations Offer Better Protection from Bycatch, WORLD WILDLIFE MAG.,
Spring 2017, https://www.worldwildlife.org/magazine/issues/spring-2017/articles/new-us
-regulations-offer-better-protection-from-bycatch#:~:text=But%20marine%20mammals
%20may%20have,US%E2%80%94including%20measures%20against%20bycatch.
[https://perma.cc/86DK-DQUL].
210
See id.

808

WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 46:781

Finally, when addressing by-catch, consumer protection and labelling laws can be expanded to increase awareness of elasmobranch bycatch.211 A good example is the current use of the “dolphin safe tuna”
labelling standard.212 Due to the high by-catch of dolphins in the Eastern
Pacific Ocean tuna fishing rings, Congress passed the Dolphin Consumer
Protection Act.213 The Act created a tracking program and labelling system, allowing companies to only sell “dolphin safe tuna” which ensures
that certain gear and by-catch control standards are met.214 The World
Trade Organization considers “dolphin safe tuna” fair trade, so long as
federal and international standards are consistent.215 This regime is an
effective example of using market incentives to promote conservation.
While the Dolphin Safe Program has been criticized as not completely
preventing by-catch,216 no labelling system exists for elasmobranchs in
the United States.217 The creation of labelling a system, which promotes
a change to new by-catch friendly technology, could be an effective first
step in preventing accidental shark and ray death. While like the Dolphin Safe Program it will not be fail-safe, an imperfect program is far
superior to no program at all.
C.

Supply Chain Monitoring

Finally, the United States should use national trade regulation
to promote elasmobranch population growth. While there are bans on
shark finning in U.S. waters, there are not strong enforcement or monitoring mechanisms in place.218 Imported sharks and rays have even less
traceability standards.219 Currently, CITES and ESA have a method of
“permits” that allows endangered sharks and rays to be imported only
under controlled circumstances, including a system of approval, quota
211

See generally Erick Kraemer, Tackling Problems of Overfishing: Protecting Sharks and
Bluefin Tuna, 25 ENV’T CL. J. 250 (2013).
212
Kristin L. Stewart, Dolphin-Safe Tuna: The Tide Is Changing, 4 ANIMAL L. 111, 118
(1998); but see Donald W. McChesney, Dolphin-Safe or Fisherman-Friendly? Abuse of
Discretion in Amendment of the Dolphin-Safe Tuna Labeling Standard, 38 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1725, 1728 (2005).
213
The Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
214
Id.
215
See Stewart, supra note 212, at 117–20, 133 n.162.
216
McChesney, supra note 212, at 1730, 1733–35.
217
See generally id.
218
US Shark Fin Trade Bans, SHARK STEWARDS, https://sharkstewards.org/shark-science
-education/us-shark-fin-trade-ban/ [https://perma.cc/58SR-V6GN] (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
219
See id.

2022]

STUCK IN THE NET

809

monitoring, and scientific research exceptions.220 However, for sharks
and rays not covered by CITES or ESA, few import laws regulating catch
exist.221 Moreover, as discussed in the by-catch section, importers of other
seafood with high shark by-catch rates do not have to prove they used bycatch-friendly methods or avoided elasmobranch by-catch at all.222 What
this leaves us with is an issue of traceability more on the international
scale than within U.S. waters. We do not know where legal shark and
ray imports are coming from. The lack of tracing creates a gap, giving
poachers an avenue through which to sell fins harvested from endangered sharks, or to sell sharks and rays illegally imported or illegally
caught by unreported or unregulated fisheries.223
To improve traceability requires improving the standards already
in place, as well as introducing new norms. CITES-protected animals, for
example, are regulated by permit, which proves both the legality of the
take and the right to import,224 but most elasmobranchs are not covered
by CITES.225 Additionally, by-catch regulations regarding sharks and
rays do not exist to the extent seen in the MMPA, which outlines that the:
Secretary of Commerce shall insist on reasonable proof
from the government of any nation from which fish or fish
products will be exported to the United States of the effects on ocean mammals of the commercial fishing technology in use for such fish or fish products exported from
such nation to the United States.226
While the administrability of such regulation is beyond the scope of this
Article, it is important to flag that for by-catch and catch import regulations to be successful there must be a traceability component included.
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Traceability has been implemented with some success for other species,
and there is no reason to believe that it cannot be used effectively for
sharks and rays.227 The problem is not one of implementation, but rather
of will. Much more can be done to protect shark and ray populations if
conservation is prioritized over politics and profit.
CONCLUSION
There is a gap in international fishing regulations which needs to
be filled by U.S. national import laws. International regulations have not
adequately protected shark and ray populations, prioritizing national
interests for profit above conservation. Unaddressed, this leaves sharks
and rays vulnerable to dangerous population declines and extinctions.
While U.S. federal laws reduce harm to sharks, rays, and skates within
U.S. waters, the current protections do not go far enough to prevent overfishing of elasmobranchs, or by-catch, in imported goods. In the past, the
United States filled similar gaps to protect marine mammals under
MMPA, and whales through its involvement in the ICW. It is time to do
the same for sharks and rays.
The need to protect sharks and rays is real and urgent. The United
States should start with protections already in place for other endangered species, and work to expand those protections to elasmobranchs.
Adding elasmobranchs into the MMPA, or an equivalent, would tackle
some of the existing gaps in protection by automatically incorporating
national fishing standards into international import regulations. Additionally, segmented changes to import laws would better enforce standards protecting against shark and ray by-catch, effectively closing this
gap. Ultimately, where international law fails to keep pace, the United
States should use its market power to promote its own sustainability
goals, using federal trade laws to protect sharks, rays, and skates, not
only within its own borders, but also on the high seas.
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